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This paper analyzes the role of incentives, risk, and information 
in determining the structure of employment contracts. In par- 
ticular, vt-e focus on the functions performed by piece rate ver- 
sus time rate payment systems and by supervisors. The relative 
reliance on piece rates versus time rates is related to risk shar- 
ing, to the use of the payment system as a method of screening 
employees, and to differential information concerning the 
difficulties of the tasks being performed. The choice of payment 
system thus depends on the attitudes towvard risk of workers and 
employers, effort supply elasticities, the souirces and magnitude 
of the uncertainties, and the nature of the suipervision used in 
the employment relation. The supervisor is viewed as monitor- 
ing inputs (enforcing contracts), screening individuals, obtain- 
ing information about the state of the wvorld, etc. These roles 
are related to the nonconvexities associated with information. 
1. Introduction * There is an enormous variety of contractual arrangements 
under which workers sell their services to firms. Economic 
theory has had little to offer, however, by way of explaining 
why particular firms choose particular contractual arrangements. 
The "details" are swept aside with the assertion that, in com- 
petitive markets, workers will get paid their marginal product. If 
there is some uncertainty, workers sell their labor, contingent 
upon the state of nature. 
The object of this paper is to analyze some of the determi- 
nants of the particular structure of contracts chosen by particular 
firms. Since contracts differ with respect to a large number of 
provisions-the amount of guaranteed pay, the incentive pay, 
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the rules by which the incentive is adjusted, the degree of 
supervision, promotion policy, retirement policy, etc.-it is not 
surprising that a larger number of detailed characteristics of 
individuals and production processes are relevant in determining 
the exact structure of contracts chosen. Theoretical work in this 
area is almost of necessity somewhat messy. We shall accord- 
ingly focus our analysis on only two aspects of the job contract: 
the choice of payment by time versus piece rates, and the 
function of supervision (monitoring). These two aspects are in 
fact closely related: the former can be viewed as an analysis of 
equilibrium wage contracts when certain kinds of monitoring are 
prohibitively expensive. Even in our analysis of these two as- 
pects of the job contract, we shall have to narrow ouI- discussion 
to a few of the primary determinants of the equilibrium wage 
contract within a competitive labor market. 
As the title of the paper suggests, the problems we focus on 
are those related to information, risk, and incentives. In fact, the 
problems of risk and incentives can be viewed as aspects of the 
economics of imperfect information: risk reflects imperfect in- 
formation about states of nature (rainfall), individuals' abilities, 
the tasks to which an individual will be assigned, etc. Conven- 
tional risk sharing arrangements face difficulties because, to the 
extent that there is risk sharing, there is likely to be a reduction 
in incentives (known as moral hazard in the insurance litera- 
ture); but incentives are a problem mainly because of difficulties 
in monitoring individuals' inputs and outputs. 
Almost all labor contracts allow both the employer and the 
employee a certain amount of discretion. They do not specify 
precisely what each party will do in each state of nature. The 
employer is allowed to assign the workers different asks;1 the 
worker is allowed some latitude in how he performs the tasks. 
This discretionary action is itself a consequence of imperfect 
information (it is impossible for the firm to predict the profit 
maximizing set of tasks to which workers should be assigned). 
Even when the contract specifies, for example, the task that is 
to be assigned in a particular state of nature, the employee may 
find it difficult o ascertain whether that state of nature has 
occurred, i.e., whether the firm is complying with the terms of 
the contract; similarly, the worker may agree to supply a given 
level of effort, but the firm may find it difficult o know whether 
an observed low output is a result of low effort or of some 
exogenous event. 
This paper is concerned with the lack of information of the 
employer and the discretionary actions of employees. The sym- 
metric problem involving the discretionary action of the 
employee is in one sense easier, in another more difficult. Firms 
as permanent institutions acquire a reputation; thus what indi- 
viduals are concerned with is distribution of tasks which are 
actually assigned. We assume a competitive labor market, and 
the terms at which a firm can attract laborers depends on this 
reputation which it has established. This is a long-run considera- 
1 This is essentially the central point of Simon's classic paper on the 
employment relationship. 
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tion; in the short run compliance with the implicit terms of the 
contract may be obtained only through the threat of the indi- 
vidual's quitting (and legal and union action). The analysis of 
this side of the market would, however, take Us beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
C A general model. Because the problems of determining the 
equilibrium wage contract are extremely complicated, we con- 
sider a number of related, simplified models. But before begin- 
ning the analysis, we shall present a general (but still not the 
most general) model; the subsequent analysis can be viewed as 
special cases of this model. 
Firms attempt to find that contract which will maximize 
profits, subject to the constraint that some workers accept the 
contract. The various provisions of the contract determine not 
only who applies and accepts employment at a given firm, but 
also performance on the job. Thus, we replace the competitive 
wage-taking hypothesis with a "utility-taking" hypothesis.2 
Firms are sufficiently small so that they believe they face hori- 
zontal supply schedules of laborers of different character, i.e., 
for any contract they offer, they face essentially either a zero 
supply or an indeterminantly large supply. The difficult question 
is, which of the infinite number of possible contracts maximizes 
profits. 
More formally, we assume there are a large number of tasks 
within the firm. We can describe the output of thejth individual 
assigned to the ith task by the kth firm by 
kQij = kFij(eii, O', Oi, Oij) (1) 
The output (per unit of time) is a function of the effort, eii, 
supplied by the worker (per unit of time) and a vector of other 
variables. These may relate to (a) some general characteristics 
of the individual (his LQ), Oi; (b) some parameter of the technol- 
ogy, 6i (e.g., the "difficulty" of the task or the amount of 
rainfall); and (c) some parameters describing characteristics of 
the individual which relate specifically to his performance of this 
task, Orj 
The effort of the individual is, in turn, a function of the 
contract between the firm and the given individual which we 
denote for the moment by coi, his information structure (e.g., his 
knowledge concerning his own abilities and the technological 
parameters of the task to which he has been assigned), denoted 
by ?2i, and his utility function. 
2 The reason that we do not replace the wage-taking hypothesis with a more 
general contract-taking hypothesis is that there are clearly an infinite number of 
possible contracts, only a few of these will be available on the market at any 
time, and there will in general not exist implicit prices by which various con- 
templated provisions may be evaluated. Thus, the firm must consider not only 
what is the best contract among those which are presently offered, but the best 
among all those which could be offered. 
This kind of framework for analyzing equilibrium contracts was originally 
explored in the context of an agricultural share-cropping economy, in Stiglitz 
[32]. There, a contract specified more than just a wage; it entailed a fixed 
payment, a share, the amount of land the individual was to work on, and if it is 
observable, the amount of labor input. 554 / J. E. STIGLITZ 
For simplicity, we shall assume that the individual's informa- 
tion structure is not affected by his actions (other than accep- 
tance of a job) but may be a function of time. Given the firm's 
wage contract, and the set of other available wage contracts, the 
individual is assumed to solve the dynamic programming prob- 
lem of maximizing his lifetime expected utility. This will deter- 
mine his level of effort at each date that he is on the job: 
ei(t) = eii(ciJV(t)). (2) 
The firm is concerned with maximizing its expected profits.3 
Expected returns R are a function of the outputs of the various 
tasks, 
Rk = Rk(kQi), (3) 
where4 hkQi = -kQij, (4) 
where the summation is taken over all the individuals assigned 
to the task. 
Labor costs are a function of the various contracts offered and 
actually accepted, of the quality of people accepting em- 
ployment, and of the effort which they provide. The firm may 
offer the individual a choice among several contracts. The set of 
wage contracts offered to an individual will be a function of the 
characteristics of the individual which are observable at that 
time, i.e., if Wk'j is the lth contract offered the jth individual by 
the kth firm, 
cvk 1e W_(O'j), (5) 
where &' are characteristics which are observable. An individual 
with information structure Ql would accept a job at the given 
firm if and only if his lifetime expected utility on that job (given 
his information) exceeded that of any other firm. Let Wj(wk') be 
the expected utility of the individual with contract I at firm k, 
then 
Wj( akj) 2W)( (,b,nj)(6 
for all C ttIj Cn(Oi) all in, n. This determines those who apply to 
the firm and the contracts (jobs) for which they apply. Individu- 
als who have the same observable characteristics may have 
other characteristics which are unobservable but important for 
production; some of these characteristics can be inferred from 
the jobs (contracts) for which the individual applies. We assume 
that if the firm hires workers under a given contract, it obtains a 
random sample of those who have applied for the job. Thus, if 
the average quality of those who apply for one contract is higher 
than that for another, we assume, on average, the quality of 
those who are hired under one contract is higher than that under 
another. 
3 The modifications required for risk averse firms are obvious. 
4 The restriction embedded in (4) is unnecessary (a general functional rela- 
tionship would do as well). 
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Thus, we can write the expected profits of the firm simply as 
a function of the contracts it offers:5 
rr = r(Wk(O)). (7) 
If W*k(6) denotes the set of contracts for which some individuals 
will accept employment at the given firm, then, simply put, the 
problem of the firm is to 
max l(Wk(0)) (8) 
subject to WkE W*k(0) 
and the problem of this paper is to characterize the solutions to 
(8). 
In much of our analysis, we further assume free entry, so 
that in market equilibrium, the maximized value of profits are 
zero. 
El Some general implications of the general model: on the rela- 
tionship between internal and external labor markets. It is the 
underlying hypothesis of this paper that insight into the deter- 
minants of the kinds of contracts in use can be derived by 
analyzing the solutions to the competitive market equilibrium 
problem posed here. Obviously, the full solution to the maximi- 
zation problems involved in the analysis requires information 
and computations beyond the capabilities of many participants 
in the market; still, if there are large and significant advantages 
of one contractual arrangement over another, firms that "dis- 
cover" the preferred contractual arrangement will find they can 
increase profits and the particular contractual arrangement will 
be imitated. Thus, it might be argued that there is an evolution- 
ary tendency of the economy to gravitate to the contractual 
arrangements analyzed here. At the same time, considerations 
of "bounded rationality" do suggest that we focus our attention 
on firm choices over relatively simple contractual arrange- 
ments.6 
This general framework makes clear that the dichotomy that 
has sometimes been suggested between internal and external 
labor markets is not a completely accurate one. The characteris- 
tics of the internal labor market are determined largely by the 
external labor market, in two senses: the terms of the structure 
of the labor market affect the wages at which it can attract labor 
and the kinds of laborers it can attract; and secondly, the kinds 
of contracts that are feasible depend on subsequent employment 
opportunities elsewhere, e.g., if information about individual 
qualities can be ascertained from the jobs to which they are 
assigned, and long-term contracts are not enforceable, in later 
5 Obviously, there are a number of other important variables, such as the 
stock of capital, which affect the profitability of the firm. 
6 It should, however, be noted that the kind of imperfect information 
involved in the argument for bounded rationality is of a different sort from those 
on which this analysis is focused. The latter is concerned with the unobservabil- 
ity of particular characteristics of particular individuals; the former with lack of 
knowledge concerning the distribution of characteristics (tastes, abilities, oppor- 
tunities) in the population as a whole and with the limitations on the ability to 
solve precisely complicated maximization problems. 556 / J. E. STIGLITZ 
stages of individuals' lives, they will receive a pay commensu- 
rate with their abilities. 
In the subsequent sections, we shall specialize this model in 
various ways. In Section 2 we consider only labor contracts 
which depend on the output of the individual and his time 
(assumed to be the only observables). We assume that all indi- 
viduals are identical, and the only random parameter is 0i,7 a 
parameter of the technology. The individual will be assigned 
only one task. We next consider the case where, in addition, 
individuals have different abilities (0') and those more able to 
know that they are more able; then the set of people who accept 
employment at any wage offer becomes important (i.e., relations 
(6) now play a crucial role). The concluding parts of Section 2 
consider the case where there is a single ability, but a distribu- 
tion of tasks to be completed. 
Section 3 shows how the introduction of supervisors can 
expand the set of contracts which can be offered, e.g., payments 
may be made functions of variables other than time or output; 
and rather than the same contract's being offered to everyone, a 
different contract is offered depending on the ability of the 
individual. 
2. Piece rate versus 
time rate 
* It is a characteristic of many, if not most, job contracts that 
payment is related both to the time spent on the job and to 
performance on the job. The former we refer to as a time rate. 
Reward for peiformance may take either the form of higher pay 
in the given period (which we refer to as a piece rate) or a higher 
probability of promotion (a higher probability of a higher wage 
at some date in the future). Our objective here is the determina- 
tion of the relative importance of time and piece rates. 
Moreover, we focus here on the case where there is no supervi- 
sion, so the level of effort of the individual cannot be ascer- 
tained and neither his ability nor any of the technological 
parameters which are assumed initially to be unknown can be 
directly obseived. Since we are considering a choice between 
piece rates and time rates, we obviously assume that both the 
labor time provided by the individual and the physical output of 
the individual can be identified. 
Both the compensation for time and performance are gener- 
ally nonlinear functions; e.g., individuals usually receive higher 
time wages for working more than 40 hours a week, and piece 
rates systems often have a minimum quota, so that compensa- 
tion as a function of performance appears as in Figure lb. 
Indeed, the pure quota system, in which individuals are paid a 
fixed amount if they meet their quota, and nothing more if they 
exceed it, can be viewed as a limiting form of a piece rate 
system (see Figure 1c). Throughout, we shall only consider 
linear time rate systems8 and we shall pay particular attention to 
7Ther-e is an alternative interpretation which in individuals may differ, but 
they are uninformed about their abilities. 
8 Since the major reasons generating nonlinear time rates are quite different 
from the kind of considerations we focus on in this paper. 
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linear piece rate systems, both because they are analytically 
simple and because they appear to be important in practice. 
We can identify several factors affecting the relative reliance 
which will be placed on piece rates versus time rates: 
(1) Because the variability of the workers' income will in- 
crease with a greater reliance on piece rates, the less the risk 
and the smaller the degree of risk aversion, the greater the 
reliance on piece rates.9 
(2) Because piece rates reward speed, they tend not to pro- 
vide the correct incentives for quality or proper care of equip- 
ment;10 thus, the more important are the variables other than 
speed of performance which are under the control of workers 
and the more difficult it is to observe these, the less the reliance 
on piece rates. 
(3) Because one of the difficulties in operating a piece rate 
system is the determination of the appropriate piece rate, the 
greater the frequency of a change in technology, and the greater 
the difficulty in ascertaining the difficulty associated with any 
task (or in determining the value added involved in any single 
operation), the less the reliance on piece rates. 
(4) The greater the responsiveness of individuals to mone- 
tary incentives, the greater the reliance on piece rates. 
(5) Because workers with greater ability receive a higher pay 
under piece rate systems, the greater the heterogeneity of the 
labor force with respect to its ability to perform the required 
tasks and the greater the difficulties associated with ascertaining 
these abilities directly, the greater the reliance on piece rates. 
In the subsequent subsections, we attempt to derive, for 
some special cases, the precise determinants of the equilibrium 
contract. 
D: Linear contracts with risk averse workers. Let 0 be the risk 
variable representing any factor affecting the relationship be- 
tween effort and output. We let e be the work effort of the 
individual. The value of output per unit of time is assumed to be 
proportional to the product of 0 and e, and we choose our units 
so that the proportionality constant is unity. (FoI simplicity, no 
other factors are employed so that output and marginal produc- 
tivity are identical.) A linear incentive scheduie thus pays an 
individual a time rate I, plus a piece rate r. The individual's 
income, C (per unit of time), is then 
FIGURE la 
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9 Obviously, reducing the risk faced by the worker increases the risk faced 
by the firm. What are crucial are differences in risk aversion. We assume, 
however, that the firm is risk neutral, so the contract depends on the risk 
aversion of workers. For a more general analysis, in a somewhat different 
context, see Stiglitz 132]. 
10 If the employee is required to pay for his own machines, then this is no 
longer a problem. Thus, the magnitude of this problem depends on how we 
organize the production process. A similar observation applies to agriculture: if 
we hired workers to pick weeds, and paid them by the weight of weeds picked, 
they would pick the largest weeds, not necessarily the ones which would most 
likely interfere with the growth of the vegetables; if we hire workers to grow 
vegetables, and pay them in proportion to their output of vegetables, they will 
pick the correct weeds. See Stiglitz [32]. 558 / J. E. STIGLITZ 
C = I + rOe. (9) 
But in competitive equilibrium (letting superbars denote means), 
with free entry, 
C=I+rOe= Oe. (10) 
Thus 
C=rOe+ (1- r)Oe=r(Oe- Oe)+ Oe. (11) 
The individual's income is a weighted average between the 
mean marginal product of those working under the given con- 
tract and the individual's own marginal product. Alternatively 
the individual's income is equal to the mean marginal product 
plus an incentive pay equal to the difference between his labor 
services and that of the mean. 
If all individuals were identical, the contract chosen would 
be that which maximized his expected utility. The individual's 
expected utility is a function of his income and effort, which in 
turn are a function of the time-wage and piece rate: 
W = EU(C,e2), (12) 
where U1 > 0, U11 ? 0, i.e., the individual is assumed to be risk 
averse and U2 > 0, U22 ? 0. If, after undertaking the job, but 
before committing himself to his "effort supply," he finds out 
the value of 0, an individual with a piece rate r and time rate I 
will choose e so that 
Ulr0 - U2 = 0. (13) 
If effort has to be decided before 0 is known, we obtain instead" 
E(UlrO- U2) = 0. (13a) 
Equation (13) (or (13a)) is solved for e as a function of r (r 
and 0). This is substituted back into (12). Thus, we can write the 
expected utility as a function of the time rate I and piece rate r: 
W = EV(r0,I), (14) 
where V is the indirect utility function.12 The equilibrium con- 
tract will be that contract which maximizes (14) subject to the 
zero profit constraint (II). The first-order conditions yield, after 
some manipulation, the result that, if e is decided before 0 is 
known, 13 
11 For this subsection, it does not matter which formulation one uses; for 
nonlinear piece rates the distinction will be important. 
12 In the case of (13a), V is a modified indirect utility function, since e will 
be independent of 0. 
3 We maximize 
EU(e(r,I)Or + LIe), 
subject to the constraint that 
I c (I - r)e0. 
Let A be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint. Then 
eEUc 0- e - (1 -r)fd = 0 
EUc - re - (1-r)6&e) 0 A THEORY 
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- E(Uc- UC)(6- 0) 
1 -r - 0U, : Rsf,2r (15) 
r 
where s, is the coefficient of variation of 0, R is the Arrow-Pratt 
measure of risk aversion, - UcC/Uc and -j is the compensated 
supply elasticity of effort, (aln e/l 1n p)J . Alternatively, letting 
Sc be the coefficient of variation in consumption, 
-E(UC - U)(C-C) 
(1 - r) CUt, Rs 2 (16) 
The piece rate depends simply on the ratio of normalized 
covariance between 0 (or C) and marginal utility of consumption 
and the supply elasticity of effort. The normalized covariance14 
depends, in turn, on the magnitude of relative risk aversion. 
Then (15) and (16) give the natural result that the piece rate is 
higher the smaller the risk, the lower the risk aversion, and the 
higher the supply elasticity of effort (the greater the incentive 
effects). Notice that when individuals are risk neutral, or when 
there is no variance in 0, r = 1: individuals simply get paid their 
marginal product. If relative risk aversion is around unity, the 
compensated supply elasticity, say 0.5, and the coefficient of 
variation of consumption 0.4, then approximately a third of 
income will come from time pay and two thirds from incentive 
pay. Similar results hold if effort is decided after 0 is known.1" 
Since 
dEU = EU(.dI + (EU( Oe)dr, 
ae (ae) ?EUcOae Ae ze + eUc? aj. 
Substituting, we obtain (15). To obtain the approximation, we observe that 
EUc(O - 6) Ucc6oer E(6 - 6)2 UccC re6 5 2 
EU(,O Uc 02 UC eO 
14 The approximation in (15) is precise for a quadratic utility function, where 
R is taken to be the elasticity of marginal utility at mean income. 
15 We obtain instead of (15) 
E(_(3- ,3)(C - C) 
(1- r) E - E/3EC (ISa) 
where 
= + (l -r) aeo x a 
the marginal utility of income, adjusted for the reduction in firm profits resulting 
from an increase in income, and 
E,/= 1 
a77( rnr) 
the compensated supply elasticity of effort, and 
- Eeo 
. Ee f 
a weighted average of the compensated supply elasticities. For some simple 
cases, (15a) may be solved explicitly. Assume there is constant marginal disutil- 560 / J. E. STIGLITZ 
D Piece rates and self-selection. When individuals of different 
abilities are willing to accept a particular contract, there are at 
least two reasons why a firm has a motivation to hire only the 
most competent individuals: so long as individuals receive some 
time rate, i.e., part of their compensation is independent of their 
performance, then average labor costs will depend on the aver- 
age productivity of the labor force; and, even if all individuals 
were paid their marginal products, if there are specific training 
(hiring/firing) costs, then it is important before those costs are 
incurred to know the qualities of the individuals being hired. 
There has recently developed a large literature on the theory of 
screening,16 the processes by which individuals are sorted out 
according to their abilities. Most of this literature has focused on 
the use of examinations and the use of surrogates for ability, 
such as education. The object of this section is to show the part 
that a piece rate system can play in screening, and to show that 
there is some presumption that the presence of individuals of 
lower ability leads to a higher piece rate. 
Consider the simplest possible case, where there are two 
ability groups in the population. Individuals know their own 
ability. In Figure 2a we have plotted their reservation-wage 
curve, as a function of the time rate and piece rate. Note that as 
we have drawn the curve, the lower ability individuals have a 
lower reservation wage if all compensation were paid in the form 
of time pay (this implies that the opportunity cost of the indi- 
viduals who are more able at this job is greater, i.e., ability to 
perform this job is correlated with ability to perform other jobs), 
but a higher reservation wage if all compensation were in terms 
of piece rates (implying a comparative disadvantage in the per- 
formance of this particular task). Other possible configurations 
are given by Figure 2b where all individuals have the same 
opportunity cost of time, and by Figure 2c where individuals 
who are less able may still have a comparative advantage in the 
performance of the given task. 
ity of labor, constant elasticity of marginal utility of income, and 0 has a 
lognormal distribution, with coefficient of variation s a2. Then 
(1 -,) = 1 -- (1 + S2)- R 
s a 
(1 + a2 
when R = I (logarithmic utility function). If the coefficient of variation of 0 were 
0.4, and r = ?2, then the individual would, on average, receive approximately 70 
percent of his compensation in the form of incentive pay, and 30 percent in the 
form of time pay (slightly less than when e was decided prior to knowing 0). 
Provided that the response of effort o an increase in the time rate is not too 
highly correlated with 0, we can approximate (15a) to obtain an expression 
identical to (16) or 
I - r Rsy2 
2 _-, r2 
where s, is the coefficient of variation for productivity (eo). 
16 See, for instance, Stiglitz [28, 33], Rothschild and Stiglitz (20], Spence [23, 
24], Arrow [4], Salop and Salop [21], Akerlof [1]. 
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The expected profits of the firm from hiring a worker of type 
j are given by1 7
Eei6i - rEei6i - I. 
Isoprofit curves are then drawn in Figure 3. If there were only the 
more productive individuals in the economy, the equilibrium 
would be at the point M1, which we have characterized in the 
previous section; we have marked the corresponding point in 
Figure 2a. A similar analysis obtains if there were only the less 
productive workers. In Figure 2a the point M2 is the point on the 
low ability reservation curve which maximizes expected profits. 
The firm now faces the choice of what contract to offer. It 
can either attempt to offer a contract which will be attractive to 
both groups, or it can offer a contract which will attract only one 
group. Consider, for instance, Figure 2a. M3 is the intersection 
between the two reservation wage curves. Any contract on the 
curve M3C is accepted only by the most able, and contracts on 
the curve BM3 only by the least able. Any contract on the curve 
AM3D is accepted by both groups. The optimal contracts if the 
firm wishes to hire only one quality of laborers is clear: it either 
offers M2, obtaining only low quality labor, or M3 (a contract on 
CM3 involving just a slightly higher piece rate than M3), obtain- 
ing only high quality laborers. Thus, the attempt to hire a higher 
quality labor force has led to a higher piece rate. 
But it is also possible that the firm may find itself in a 
situation where it cannot (as in Figure 2c) or does not wish to 
exclude the less able. Then the profitability at any point along 
the reservation curve of the more able is a weighted average of 
the profitabilities of the two groups, with the weights being the 
relative sizes of the two groups (in the applicant pool).18 By 
increasing the piece rate, although profitability on the more able 
individuals is reduced, that on the less able individuals is in- 
creased (assuming the supply elasticities do not differ much): 
again a presumption for a higher piece rate. This may be seen in 
Figure 3b. Because the isoprofit curve for the less able is steeper 
than that for the more able,19 a slight increase in the piece rate 
FIGURE 3 
EQUILIBRIUM WITH SELF 
SELECTION 
H- 
cr MMORE ABLE 
LU / RESERVATION WAGE 
L / 









670Hi can be thought of as a summary random variable, representing the 
effect of all other random variables on the output per unit effort of the jth 
individual. 
18 In the analysis of Rothschild and Stiglitz [201, there could not, in general, 
be an equilibrium in which both the more able and the less able work together, 
i.e., if we apply their analysis of the insurance market to the problem at hand, 
the only equilibrium would be at point M3, where prices of commodities adjust 
so that the profitability of that contract is zero. The analysis here can, however, 
be thought of in a somewhat broader context, e.g., where there is not necessarily 
free entry, so profits may not be zero. and no two firms are quite identical. Thus, 
each firm takes the reservation wage curves as given. 
19 The isoprofit schedtule is defined by 
v (1 - )Q - I. 
where Q is his mean output. Thus 
I _ (1 - r) alnQ 
_ ar Q I alnI 
adJr ; + dlQ(1 -r)) 
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above M1 has a negligible ffect on the profitability obtained 
from the more able workers but a strictly positive effect on the 
profitability obtained from the less able workers. Note that since 
the less able are above their reservation wage, it is only the 
more able's reservation wage curve that matters. 
More generally, for each piece rate and time rate the firm 
announces, there will be a different set of applicants. The 
profitability ofthe firm can again be written 
Q(I - r) - 1, 
where Q, mean output per worker, is just Ee 0, where now the 
expectation is taken not only over 0 for each type applying, but 
also over the types applying. Thus, an interior solution will 
entail20 
Q 0= (I ar 
(1-r) ail -Q-?0 (1 r)2- ) a 1 - 0. 
Changes in the mean values of output, Q, will be related then 
not only to incentive ffects (r), income effects (I), but also to 
self-selection effects, i.e., a change in the composition of appli- 
cants. In general, this would be expected to increase the effect of 
an increase in the piece rate on mean output (per worker); an 
increase in I, however, may now actually increase Q (rather 
than reduce it); that is, if more able individuals have higher 
opportunity costs of their time, an increase in I increases the 
mean quality of the applicant labor force. It is this which ena- 
bles there to be an inteiior solution, i.e., one where further 
reductions in I (for given r) do not eliminate all applicants 
altogether. This corresponds to the well-known phenomenon that 
firms pay higher wages than they "have to" in order to obtain a 
higher quality labor force. This in turn implies that equilibrium 
may not entail supply equaling demand: the conventional argu- 
ment that when the supply of labor exceeds demand wages fall 
to equilibrate the market is not applicable here.21 
Note, however, that if individuals are per-fectly well in- 
formed about their own abilities, and there are no other sources 
of risk, then equilibrium will entail the firm setting r = 1, and 
auctioning off the jobs to the highest bidder, i.e., a nonpositive 
time rate. (If the time rate were positive, then the firm would be 
making losses.) This result is independent of the distribution of 
Thus, provided a1nQ!llnI and -3lnQ/3lnr are not too different, the smaller 
Q-the less the productivity-the steeper the isoprofitability curve. Intuitively, an 
increase in the time rate increases cost per worker the same, regardless of ability, 
but increases cost per unit of output more the smaller the productivity of a worker. 
Thus, the reduction in piece rate required to keep the profits the same is larger. 
20 This is again an analysis based on a partial equilibrium approach. If there 
are large numbers of firms which are identical, there may again be a problem 
with equilibrium, but not only because of the reasons alluded to in note 18 
above. Even if the wage itself were the only instruiment available to the firm for 
affecting the quality of its labor force, there might not exist an equilibrium (the 
Rothschild-Stiglitz analysis assumed that there were two or more instruments 
available, the price and the amount of coverage). See Stiglitz [31]. 
21 See Akerlof [1] and Stiglitz [33]. 
A THEORY 
01 HIERARCHY 1 563 
abilities or tastes for work in the population; the individual who 
bids the highest may not be the one who is the most able; the 
bids will depend on the ability to perform the task relative to his 
opportunity cost; if all individuals have the same opportunity 
cost, then it is the most able who obtain the job.22 
E1 Variable tasks with linear incentive schemes. The jobs con- 
sidered in the previous two sections could be considered "single 
task jobs": the individual takes a job, the job has associated 
with it a single task, and he does not know how much effort will 
be required on his part to perform the task. 
Many jobs, however, entail the performance of multiple 
tasks. For instance, an individual in a machine shop will be 
required to make a variety of kinds of machines. The piece rates 
may differ, but not in proportion to the effort required by him to 
perform each task. If there are a large number of tasks, and he 
can borrow and lend, then the marginal utility of income accru- 
ing from his performance of each task will be approximately the 
same (i.e., he can smooth his income stream), but there will be 
variability in effort required. Thus, "effort risk aversion" is 
crucial in determining the equilibrium wage contract, not income 
risk aversion. Moreover, if the distribution of tasks is given, 
then by altering the speed with which different asks are per- 
formed, the distribution of time spent performing tasks of differ- 
ent difficulties will be altered. This leads to the result that there 
will be a negative time rate. (Of course, a negative time rate is 
not usually directly observed; however, by setting a low "base 
rate" and a high piece rate, if the piece rate schedule were 
extrapolated back to the "origin" it would imply a negative time 
rate, as in Figure 4.) 
The model is a slight modification of that of Section 1. We 
assume all individuals are identical. Oi represents the output 
produced by a unit of effort applied for a unit of time on the ith 
task; thus i/6i is the time required to complete the task when the 
individual applies an effort level of e. The individual works for a 
large firm, and takes the distribution of tasks assigned to him as 
given, independent of his own level of effort. As we argued 
earlier, it is reasonable in this context to take a utility function 
of the form 
C - Z(e), 
where Z(e) is the disutility of effort. Then, when assigned the ith 
task, with a time rate of I and a piece rate of r (we normalized 
our units so all tasks have the same piece rate), he maximizes 
I + re0 - V(e), (17) 
where we have dropped the subscript on 0. It is convenient to 
introduce the variable, 
22 The model presented in Mirrlees' paper where individuals differ in their 
abilities but have the same opportunity cost of their time is essentially this 
special case; thus his result that all individuals get paid their marginal product is 
equivalent to the result that all except one group are excluded, and this may be 
done by a linear incentive scheme of the kind discussed here. 
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x = e0, (18) 
the speed of production. Then the individual maximizes 
I + rx- V X (19) 
i.e. 23 
r= VI (20) 
The firm chooses I and r to minimize its expected costs; since to 
produce one unit takes Ole periods, expected costs are just 
IE 1 + r. (21) x 
It minimizes (21) subject to the constraint that the expected 
utility per unit of time be equal to its opportunity cost, W: 
I + rEx - EV(x0) = W. (22) 
Substituting (22) into (21), and differentiating (making use of 
(20)), we obtain 
I -ExE 1 -IE 1 dx - 0 x x dr 
or 
ExE 1 -1 
E dx 
X2 dr 
Since lIx is a convex function 
E - < (24) x Ex 
so the numerator of (23) is positive; from (20) 
dx - 02>0 
dr Vi>" (25) 
Hence, the optimal incentive scheme entails I < 0. To obtain 
some order of magnitude of the terms in (23), we take a Taylor 
series approximation, assume V(e) = kea, and that 0 is lognor- 
mally distributed, with coefficient of variation so to obtain 
I___ -o|a (S 2 + 1) (Ia) - 
Erx (I+a)2 
(S 2 + 1 ) 
The greater the variance of 0 and the greater the elasticity of 
marginal disutility of effort, the more negative is I (relative to 
total pay, provided a , 1). 
23 This assumes on each task he knows 0 before deciding on e (or he quickly 
learns 0). 
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LI Revision of piece rate schedules. One of the classical com- 
plaints of workers against the piece rate system is that if they 
work harder, the piece rate is revised. The question is, how can 
we explain this revision procedure? Surely, if the value of the 
output of the individual can easily be ascertained, then he 
should simply be paid according to his marginal product. There 
are two circumstances in which the value of output of the 
individual cannot be ascertained: 
(1) The individual is working in a group and only the group 
output is identifiable.24 
(2) The individual's physical output can be identified, but 
there are no prices to guide the firm in determining the value of 
his output. This is typically the case in very specialized produc- 
tion: there is a market price for the final output, but no price for 
the output of each stage or component in the production pro- 
cess. 
In such circumstances the worker is likely to have better 
knowledge of the true cost of production (say, in units of labor 
effort) than the manager. This again can be viewed as essentially 
a screening problem: the firm attempts to obtain information 
about the true labor requirements from the individual, to screen 
the different jobs according to difficulty. The individual has an 
obvious incentive for informing the manager when the job is 
difficult (when the piece rate is set too low) but he has no 
corresponding incentive to inform the manager when the job is 
easy, i.e., when the piece rate set is too high. Thus, the direct 
statements of the workers concerning the difficulty of the job 
which has been assigned to him lack criedibility. The firm seeks 
to infer information about the difficulty of the task from the 
revealed behavior of the individual; when it obtains this informa- 
tion, it uses it to revise the piece rate. 
In the absence of information, jobs of differing difficulties 
receive the same piece rate; there will be a distortion: the 
marginal rates of substitution between consumption (income) 
and effort will differ on different tasks. Although the information 
reduces this distortion, the method basing the inference about 
the job difficulty on previous peiformance has a cost: it reduces 
the incentive to work; in effect, it lowers the piece rate. Again, 
the optimal contract will be designed to balance at the margin 
the benefits and costs of obtaining the information. 
The equilibrium contract will be that contract which 
maximizes expected profit at the exogenously given level of 
expected utility of the workers. What we wish to show is that, 
under a simple linear revision scheme, some revision of the 
piece I-ate will in general be desirable. 
Thus, we considei- the model of the previous section, but 
assume the tasks come in "batches," e.g., the individual is 
required to pi-oduce ten machines of a given type. The firm can 
announce then that after a given fiaction of the machines has 
been completed, or after a given peiiod of time has elapsed, then 
it will revise its piece rate, according to a i-ule based on pi-evious 
peiformance. 
24 This is the subject discussed in Rothschild-Stiglitz [20] and Akerlof [1]. '66 / .1. E. STIGLITZ 
We need to distinguish two cases: in one, a task is assigned 
to only one individual. There is no way by comparing the per- 
formance of this individual and that of others that the firm can 
ascertain the true difficulty ofthe job. The revision of the piece 
rate must then depend only on the individual's own output. In 
the second case, there is a large group of individuals perfori- 
ing the same task. The revision will depend on the mean output of 
the gr-oup; the individual's income will then depend on the piece 
rate at his own output. We assume in that case that the group is 
sufficiently arge that the individual ignores the effect of his 
output on the revision. Analytically, the second case is some- 
what easier to handle, and so we discuss it first. 
Linear revision schedules wvith large grouips 
The analysis for this case is simple because, from the indi- 
vidual's viewpoint, the two periods (before and after ievision) 
are completely separated. 
We assume that in the first period the individual's income is 
given by 
1 + r'1xl, 
where, it will be recalled, x1 is the speed of production, i.e., 
X1 e10. 
In the second period the individual's income is 
I2+ r2X2, 
where r2 is assumed to be a linear function of performance first 
period (x1) 
= 2 - yx1 (26) 
Thus, the ith period the individual maximizes 
Ii + ix, -V Xi (27) 
i .e., 
-i = v, Xi) (28) 
The firm seeks to minimize xpected costs, C. Let N be the 
total number of units of each task to be performed. Thien, 
(N - xl) remain to be done after the revision occurs. If the 
worker works at speed x2, it will take him 
I- N-xl (29) 
X2 
time to complete the task. Thus, expected costs can be written 
EC = E [I1 + r1x1 + I21 + r2(N - x1)]. (30) 
The firm minimizes (29) subject to paying what is required to 
obtain labor, i.e., expected utility (per unit time) must be equal 
to the opportunity cost: 
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E C- I0 + 0) W. (31) 
Detailed calculations25 show that if we make the first period 
sufficiently long, 
dEC < 0 (32) 
i.e., it always pays to have some revision.26 
One of the interesting implications of revision schedules is 
that, unlike the cases analyzed in Section 1, where it would pay 
the workers to collude to work harder, here, the workers all 
believe that they can be made better off if they collude not to 
work so hard; that is, if they take the payment parameters as 
given, they observe that by colluding, they can increase their 
expected utility. They believe that the workers who are working 
very hard are exerting a negative externality on the rest. But if 
they do collude, and if there is an elastic supply of labor, the 
firm will respond to the collusion by changing the parameters of 
the payment schedule. The firm will observe that the supply of 
effort functions will not be given by the solution to (28) but by 
the solution to (34) and (35) below, i.e., taking into account the 
effect of effort on the revision. The consequence of collusion is 
that, in the new equilibrium, the workers have the same level of 
expected utility, but that expected costs of producing have 
risen. Once the firm has adjusted the payments schedule to take 
25 With no revision, y = 0, Il = I2, 1r1 = 8. Hence 
dEC) = dI 1_ E (N-X - Exl(N - x1). 
deyo dy X22 dy 
dx2/dy < 0 follows directly from (28). Our earlier analysis showed that Ii 0, 
when y = 0. Finally, rewriting (31), 
E I1 + I21 (r1x,- V(x1/6)) I [X2 -YX1X2 -V(X2/0)] 
+ 1+ + 1+1 
At y = 0, 
by = E _XiX,21 = -E XJN xi) 
1+I* b =E li . 
Hence 
Ex(N - x2< Exl(N-xl), 
E 
I + I 
if the first period is sufficiently long that 
dxO(N - Xi) = (N - 2x)do < 0, 
since d[ 1/(1 + I)]/dO > 0, i.e., if the initial period is sufficiently long so that at least 
half of the task is accomplished before revision. 
In the above calculations, the expectation is taken over those values of 0 
sufficiently small that the task is not completed in the first period. 
26 That is, we can find a length of the first period such that for some values 
of 0 revision is required. 568 / J. E. STIGLITZ 
account of the collusion, they will all observe that if they fail to 
collude, expected utility will be below their opportunity cost.27 
Linear revision schedules with individualized jobs 
Here we consider the case where the jobs assigned to each 
individual are slightly different. The consequence of this is that 
individuals are aware of the effect of their effort supply the first 
period on the payments the second period, and on the length of 
the second period. 
Thus, the individual chooses xl and I to maximize 
W = 




v 0'Xl~ Vf !X2 
ri - ,{-y(N- 2x,)- _ + =0 (34) 
and 
I2 - W + V'(N- x1) -V =wI- - VoX2 + v'X2 X2 W 
(35) 
Again the firm wishes to minimize expected costs subject to the 
constraint (31), where now, however, xl and 1 (or x2) are given 
by (34) and (35) rather than (28). Again it can be shown that 
aEC < O 
if the first period is sufficiently long.28 
27 We assume that there is tacit or explicit collusion within the shop, but 
that there is still a competitive labor market; present workers cannot restrict the 
supply of labor to the firm. 
28 The only alteration in the earlier calculations follows from (35), which we 
can solve for x2/0 independent of y. Thus ax2/ay= 0. At y= 0, ri -3, 
ax, = (N - 2x,) 
ay V"' 
axl >0, ax2 >0, <0 
ao ao a 
dEC = E[I2 ay1(N xl)+ a dy TY ay 
EXI(N- xl) 
ay E 1 1 r 
The rest of the calculations follow as before. 
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3. Towards a theory 
of hierarchy 
0 Some recent attempts to explain the hierarchical production 
structure have been based implicitly on a "conspiratorial view" 
of economics, that, somehow, the bosses developed a production 
structure which necessitated the presence of bosses. We do not 
wish here to evaluate the validity of that view, or to enquire 
whether a consistent "endogenous technical change" model 
with such an outcome can be formulated, although these are 
questions which are perhaps woirth pursuing. Rather, I wish to 
suggest an alternative model in which the hierarchical produc- 
tion relations result from the natural forces of competition. 
We need to distinguish between two senses in which the term 
"hierarchy" is used: (a) vertical hierarchies, i.e., the use of 
authority (direct commands) as opposed to monetary or other 
forms of incentives; and (b) horizontal hierarchies, i.e., the use 
of differential treatment of individuals, in terms of status, pay, 
etc. Here we are concerned only with the former. 
Vertical hierarchies necessarily entail the existence of super- 
visors. In Section 5, the supervisor is viewed as obtaining in- 
formation that formerly was lacking; whether it is economically 
efficient o have the supervisor depends on the value of this 
information relative to the costs of the supervisor. 
Another- set of functions of supervisors relates to his role as 
a decision maker; Section 5 also develops an argument for some 
centralization of decisionmaking on the basis of certain noncon- 
vexities associated with information. 
C Supervisors and imperfect information. We began Section 2 
with a list of the primary determinants of the choice between 
piece and time rates. Two of the reasons for using the piece rate 
system relate to a lack of information, which a supervisor could 
at least partially remedy: (a) incentives are required because 
inputs cannot be directly observed (supervisors as monitors of 
inputs); (b) the piece rate system affects the quality of the labor 
force, when the quality of individuals cannot be directly ob- 
served (supervisors as monitors of ability). Two of thie limita- 
tions on the use of the piece rate system may, at the same time, 
be alleviated by supervisors: (a) supervisors may serve as 
monitors of output, e.g., ensuring that quality standards are 
adhered to, or, in situations where only the group output is 
easily observable,29 ascertaining the contribution of different 
members of the group; (b) supervisors are required to determine 
the appropriate piece rates. The supervisors are thus acting as a 
substitute for the price system (which would provide the ap- 
propriate piece rates). 
In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on the role of 
supervisors as monitors of inputs. Section 2 established that if 
the effort of the individual could not be directly observed, then 
the equilibrium contract would entail a piece rate in addition to a 
time rate. The outputs were random, but because inputs could 
not be identified, the individual could not obtain complete insur- 
ance for his risky income. At the same time, the partial insur- 
29 These kinds of production activities have been extensively discussed by 
Akerlof [1] and Stiglitz [33] in the context of self-selection mechanisms for 
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ance that he did obtain reduced his work incentives. These are 
the two costs of the incomplete information: the greater risk 
absorbed by the individual and the lower work effort. Informa- 
tion about inputs may be obtained-but at a cost: the cost of the 
supervisor who monitors the inputs of the individual. 
There are several aspects of the individual's performance 
that the supervisor might monitor. When output and 0 are ob- 
servable, e can be inferred and if output and e are observable, 0 
can be inferred. This immediately enables a new range of con- 
tracts to be considered. 
The simplest would have the individual agree to exert a given 
amount of effort. The output would then depend on 0 and e. His 
pay would not, however, depend on output. Were such a con- 
tract feasible, the individual would (in an ex acnte sense) be 
better off than he would be with the contracts discussed earlier. 
For he can now completely eliminate all risk. The optimal con- 
tract is given by 
OUI(C) = V'(e), (42) 
where 
C = eO. 
If U"' > 0, U'0 is a concave function of 0, 
EU'6 < U'(eO)o, (43) 
and the average income of individuals will be higher in this 
contract than in the ones described in Section 1 .30 
Workers voluntarily undertake to be supervised; a certain 
amount of compulsion will be a characteristic of competitive 
equilibrium. They each are working harder than the incentive 
system itself provides an inducement to work. They submit to 
being compelled to work harder than direct incentives provide 
for, because the consequence is a higher expected utility.31 
30 To assure the concavity of U'C, we require, if e is decided after 0. that 
d2e/dO2 > 0. 
31 A still better contract from an ex anite point of view is one in which the 
individual commits himself to a level of effort as a function of 0. If such a 
contract were enforceable, the optimal contract would entail the individual's 
receiving the same income regardless of the 0 he faced, but those who experi- 
ence higher 0 (e.g., were assigned a better piece of land or an easier job) work 
harder. That is, the individual would sign the contract that maximized 
EU(C(t)) - V(e(6)), (i) 
where 
EC(6) = Ee(O) 0. (ii) 
The solution to (1) entails 
U' = constant for all 0 
and 
V =constant for all 0. 6 
Those with higher 0 have a high marginal disutility of effort, i.e., they work 
more. Their ex post utilities are actually lower than those with low ability. These 
results are exactly parallel to Mirrlees' results for the optimal distribution of 
income in a utilitarian framework in a completely controlled economy. When 0 
represents the individual's ability to perform a particular job, the perverse 
incentive effects (i.e., individuals' hiding their abilities) are even stronger with 
this contract than with that previously discussed. 
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Although each worker may resent this compulsion and feel it is 
unnecessary on his own part, he prefers to work for firms which 
use this compulsion, recognizing that without it, some of his 
colleagues will slough on the job, and thus firms which employ 
some degree of compulsion are able to pay higher wages. 
This contract appears reasonable when the 0 which is being 
monitored is an exogenously determined risk variable (the 
weather, the quality of the machine which the individual has to 
work on, etc.); but where the risk variable is the individual's 
ability to perform the given task, there would be a strong incen- 
tive for the more able individual to pretend that he was not 
particularly capable and thus economize on his effort. Some 
levels of incentive schemes would still be required. 
In deciding on whether to accept a contract with this kind of 
compulsion, individuals who dislike authority relationships may 
require considerable additional compensation to induce them to 
accept this kind of employment relationship. One of the disad- 
vantages of this kind of relationship is that it may not allow the 
kind of individual variability (e.g., on a day-to-day basis) that 
the piece rate system allows. The viability of such contracts is 
then a reflection of the fact that for some individuals, these 
disadvantages are outweighed by the greater wages and more 
certain incomes that firms who use these contracts can pay. 
There is some ambiguity about whether the relationships 
defined in this section ought to be referred to as authority 
relationships. Incentive structures such as those discussed in 
Section 2 clearly do not involve authority relationships. On the 
other hand, extreme nonlinear incentive structures, which take 
the form: if the worker does not complete this task, he will 
receive no pay or will be fired, might or might not be thought of 
as an authority relationship. If there were no uncertainty about 
whether or not the task was completed, then there is no discre- 
tion on the part of the supervisor, and it is unlikely that we 
would refer to this as an authority relationship. But if there is 
uncertainty about whether the task is completed, then the 
supervisor is, in effect, in the position of whether to authorize 
payment to the individual. Since payment will, as a result, be 
stochastic, the amount (or quality) of supervision will affect both 
the optimal incentive scheme which will be used and the level of 
expected utility which the individual will attain. Thus the 
analysis presented here and in Section 2 may be viewed as 
presenting two polar cases-where there is no monitoring of 
input, and perfect monitoring of input. Most employment con- 
tracts involve some, but not complete monitoring.32 
D Supervisors and intervention. The function of supervisors in 
making decisions, intervening in the actions of the subordinates, 
giving commands, is perhaps the aspect that is most central to 
the radical interpretation of the role of supervisors. The previ- 
ous section delineated this role as a contract enforcer. 
There is, however, more to the role of the supervisor as a 
32 For a more extended discussion of these issues, see Stiglitz [32] and 
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giver of commands than simply that of contract enforcer. All 
agents in the economy possess a certain degree of autonomy in 
performing their tasks; on the other hand, there are conditions 
under which there is some intervention with the autonomy. It is 
this aspect of supervisors which I wish to discuss here. 
We can imagine a number of ways in which a firm can 
respond to a new or unusual contingency or to new information: 
(1) The firm designs a set of incentive structures, such that 
as contingencies or new information arises, individuals respond 
in the way that is optimal from the point of view of the firm, 
without direct monitoring of the worker. 
(2) The firm designs a set of routines (commands), which 
distinguish among the different contingencies, and a monitor- 
ing-reward structure that induces individuals to follow the 
routines. 
(3) The firm instructs the individual to consult the supervisor 
when a particular set of contingencies or a particular category of 
new information arises; the supervisor then makes a decision, 
instructing the worker what to do. 
(4) The firm maintains a monitor on the various contingen- 
cies (or on new information); when contingencies for which the 
worker should take an action other than that provided for by the 
ordinary incentive structure (or the ordinary set of commands) 
occur, the supervisor intervenes and issues a new set of corn- 
mands or a new incentive structure. 
(5) Finally, the firm can simply fail to take cognizance of the 
contingency, treating this "state of nature" as if it were the 
ordinary state of nature. 
The first two responses involve the supervisor only in the 
roles which we discussed earlier;33 the third involves the super- 
visor in the role as a consultant; in the fourth the supervisor 
directly intervenes in the actions of the worker, and it is in this 
role that the authority relationship is most clearly exercised. 
Thus, in the fourth organizational form, there is intervention by 
the supervisor in the autonomy which the individual has in the 
performance of his tasks. Each of these methods of responding 
to a particular contingency has its costs and benefits. 
What I wish to argue in this section is that these information 
flows involve a number of different nonconvexities; these non- 
convexities give rise in turn to specialization, and it is this which 
provides the economic justification for the authority relation- 
ships. (The choice of organizational form may depend, of couse, 
on a number of other factors, e.g., workers' attitudes towards 
authority. These aspects of the problem have been extensively 
discussed in the literature on organization theory.34 The discus- 
sion of this section should thus be seen as complementing this 
literature, in focusing on an aspect of the problem which has 
perhaps received insufficient attention.) 
33 This routinization is close to what March and Simon call performance 
programs. 
34 See, for instance, March and Simon 112j. 
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Benefits 
The return to intervention is that the supervisee, without 
intervention, may take actions which are not in the interests of 
the firm. Now in the case of routitnized actions, those which 
occur repeatedly, this is no more than another aspect of contract 
enforcement. But the class of events we are interested in here 
are those which occur in r esponse to events which occur 
sufficiently infrequently that the firm has not specified the cor- 
rect action to be taken by the supervisee, and/or has not de- 
signed the incentive scheme to take these events into account 
appropriately. Many of these events are of relatively little im- 
portance: the worker on the assembly line observes a part which 
is defective in a way which is unusual. He must make a judg- 
ment about whether the part should be discarded or used. There 
may be some incentive for the individual to attempt to make the 
correct judgment:35 if he does, he is more likely to be promoted. 
But even if he has no incentive, and simply decides randomly, it 
may not pay the firm to intervene in the action; for the time 
required for the supervisor to come to the assembly line, 
examine the part, and make a decision is simply not worth it. 
There are, however, other nonroutinized events which are obvi- 
ously important., and for which intervention would clearly be 
desirable. 
Costs 
We need to distinguish between several categories of costs of 
the various organizational forms: (a) The fixed costs of setting up 
the system. This is primarily associated with the design of the 
appropriate routines and incentive structures. (b) The costs of 
training workers, of teaching them how they should respond in 
different contingencies. (If workers are good optimizers, then all 
they have to learn is the complete incentive structure, but when 
there are a number of different kinds of actions which the 
worker can take, the incentive structures may be very compli- 
cated.) Presumably, it is less costly to teach them to act as an 
information filter, i.e., to recognize certain classes of contingen- 
cies to refer to the supervisor, than to teach them to both 
recognize the contingencies and take the correct actions. (c) The 
cost of continuous monitoring, in the case where the supervisor 
must intervene in the actions of the worker. (d) The cost of 
having the supervisor available as a consultant. (e) The variable 
cost which arises when the contingency occurs. Thus, in organi- 
zation (3), where the supervisor acts as a consultant, there is 
both a cost of the worker consulting the supervisor, and the 
supervisor issuing a command to the worker, while in organiza- 
35 A central aspect in which the analysis in this context differs from the 
theory of teams is that the workers and the managers (owners of firms) do not 
necessarily have the same objectives. There is not only a question of efficient 
transmission of information, but also-as we noted in our earlier discussion 
where workers know the difficulty of the job they undertook-of inducing 
individuals to reveal this information. Our earlier discussion also provided an 
example of a (second best) method of inducing individuals to reveal information 
to the firm, which could then use the information to provide a "better" incentive 
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tion (4) there is only the cost of communicating the decision 
from the supervisor to the worker. The first set of costs are once 
and for all costs. The second set is a cost per unit time, but the 
magnitude of the costs depends on the rate of labor turnover. 
The costs (c) and (d) are fixed costs per unit time, but the 
magnitude of these can vary, depending on the quality of ser- 
vices to be provided by the supervisor. Finally, cost (e) is a 
variable cost. Thus, to a large extent, the choice of organization 
forms can be viewed as a tradeoff between fixed and variable 
costs. 
The costs of routinization are likely to be independent of the 
gains to be had from routinization, so that it only pays to 
undertake these large fixed costs for events for which the ex- 
pected gain-i.e., the value of the gain times the expected fre- 
quency of the contingency's occurring-are large. On the other 
hand, the choice of whether to employ the supervisor as a 
consultant oi to have the supervisor monitor the status and 
intervene depends on the relative size of the fixed costs (training 
costs in one case, versus monitoring costs in the other) and the 
expected vaiiable costs (which depend in turn on the probability 
of occui-rence times the difference in the variable costs, when 
the contingency arises). For events which occur sufficiently 
infrequently that the expected variable costs are low, interven- 
tion would appear optimal. Rather than undertake the large 
costs of training individuals to recognize contingencies which 
occur relatively infrequently, it may be preferable to have an 
individual who specializes in the acquisition and transmittal of 
information.36 
This argument, as plausible as it seems, becomes less con- 
vincing when we allow the amount of information to be variable: 
why not give a little information to a large number of individuals 
rather than give a lot of information to a few? To have the kind 
of specialization in economic activities that the above analysis 
suggests requires a nonconvexity. In fact, there are two non- 
convexities associated with information. The first is that the 
36 More formally, let Bi be the gross benefit occurring under the ith organiza- 
tion form, Ri be the fixed costs of routinization (for organization forms I and 2), t, 
be the cost of training individuals under the ith organizational form, S/i/7 be 
the supervisory costs, i' be the cost of transmitting a decision from the super- 
visor to the worker, it be the cost of transmitting information from the worker to 
the supervisor, N be the number of workers, - be the frequency of the event, 
and p(N) be the probability, given that the event has occurred, that the super- 
visor will deiect it. Thus, to decide what kind of organization to employ, we 
compare 
rTB1 - RI - NtI - 17 
rrB2 -R2 - Nt2 -S2, 
rTB3 - Nt3 - 7r1( + v) - S3T, 
pT(B4 - v) + (1 - p)rB5 - S47, 
7rB5. 
Normally, we expect 
R1 > R2, S1 < S2 < S3 < S4, 
B5 < B1 < B2 ? B3 = B4, 
and 
t3 < t1, and t3 < t2 
The dependence of the choice of organizational form on the various parameter 
follows in a straightforward manner. 
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value of a given amount of information increases with how 
frequently it can be used; that is, even if the initial cost of 
acquisition of information of the employee and the supervisor 
were the same, in a hierarchical structure the supervisor uses 
the information more frequently. Unlike conventional com- 
modities, each use does not detract from the "stock" of infor- 
mation he has-and indeed, to the extent that there is learning, 
it may actually increase it. Although this provides an argument 
for specialization, the advantages of specialization may be offset 
by the fact that workers may find it easier to acquire certain 
categories of information: a naturally joint product of the per- 
formance of their tasks is the acquisition of certain information 
(e.g., observations about defects in the mateiials with which 
they are working).37 On the other hand, many categories of 
information (e.g., concerning market phenomena) can more eas- 
ily be obtained as joint products of other activities in which the 
supervisor is engaged; moreover, if the information impinges on 
the actions of a large number of individuals, it may be less 
expensive for the supervisor to acquire the information and then 
transmit it to the workers, than to have each worker acquire it 
himself. 
Secondly, it can be shown that in general, it does not pay to 
acquire just a little bit of information: a little information has 
negative net value, i.e., the costs always exceed the benefits.38 
Thus it does not pay to monitor just a little; it either pays not to 
monitor at all, or to monitor at a finite level. This, I suggest, 
may provide a framework not only for defining the degree of 
autonomy of individuals within their jobs, but also for defining 
the boundaries of firms.39 
The literature on organization theory40 nas long recognized 
the costs of acquiring and disseminating information, the role 
of supervisors in this process, and the bounds on rationality 
which result from the fact that information is costly. What we 
have attempted to do in this section is to relate supervision to 
the structure of the technology of information, to argue that 
fundamental nonconvexities associated with information result 




* The problems we have analyzed in this paper can be viewed 
as special cases of the class of problems which we have dis- 
cussed under the rubric of "the Theory of Screening." The essen- 
3 Much of the literature on decentralization has focused on this case, where 
information naturally arises in the periphery, and then flows to the center. 
38 See Radner and Stiglitz [19]. 
39 The characteristic of independent firms is that the only intervention is 
provided automatically-when the firm is unable to pay its debtors. The merging 
together of two firms requires the expenditure of a continuing fixed cost thereaf- 
ter by the parent firm in monitoring the performance of the acquisition. 
40 See, for example, March and Simon [12], and Williamson [34]. 
41 The argument, of course, is only a qualitative one; that is, one can show 
that under quite general conditions there will exist some nonconvexities. To 
explain specialization requires that these nonconvexities be in some sense sig- 
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tial problem of the theory of screening arises from the inability 
of some agent in the economy (the insurance firm, the govern- 
ment, the employer) to distinguish costlessly among objects 
which are, or are potentially, different. 
Here we have been concerned with the problems associated 
with distinguishing levels of effort and ability of different indi- 
viduals and distinguishing the level of difficulties associated with 
different jobs. 
Of course, not all kinds of imperfect information can be cast 
into the screening framework, and indeed, the discussion of 
Section 3 was intended to delineate those cases where the im- 
perfect information could and could not be viewed as a screen- 
ing problem. 
Most of the paper was concerned with how firms (and their 
workers) came to terms with imperfections of information of the 
kind associated with screening. The theory of screening has 
identified several different ways in which the economy responds 
to the absence of this kind of information: 
(1) The firm may attempt to reduce the costs imposed by the 
absence of information. Coinsurance clauses in insurance 
policies make it less important for the insurance company to 
observe the actions of the individual; here incentive pay makes 
it less important to observe the level of effort of the individual. 
(2) The firm may attempt to obtain the information indirect- 
ly, to infer the information from the actions taken by the indi- 
vidual. Examples of this are given in Section 2, where the 
performance of the individual reveals information about the 
difficulty of the job or his ability. 
Thus, most of Part 1 could be considered an exploration of 
these two alternative approaches to the existence of imperfect 
information. Part 2 on the other hand, was concerned with the 
alternative approach. 
(3) There may be a direct expenditure in observing the dif- 
ferences; this is analogous to "screening by examination" in the 
context of education. Here we have identified direct examina- 
tion with the supervisor; he observes how hard the individual is 
working or the ability of the individual. 
This paper has thus been concerned with the demand for 
supervision and the return to having a hierarchical production 
structure. We have argued that individuals without information 
about their abilities to peiform a particular job (or who face 
other risks) would be willing to pay for supervision to ensure 
that they and others work harder than they have a direct incen- 
tive to work; that individuals with information about their 
abilities42 are willing to pay to have supervision to ascertain 
these abilities so that they can capture their ability rents; and 
that for individuals who have information about their abilities 
but face other risks affecting their marginal productivities, there 
is a return to a hierarchical production structure. 
The desirability of the hierarchical production structure 
42 If they believe their abilities to be above average. Similar results obtain 
for individuals who are less averse to working hard 
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must, of course, be related to the value of supervision in relation 
to its cost, and in this paper we have ignored the costs of 
supervision. A theory which p-urports to explain the evolution of 
the hierarchical structure of production must be concerned with 
how changes in technology affected the costs and benefits of this 
method of organizing production. These are questions which 
will have to be puisued elsewhere. 
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